

## Introduction

This document outlines all rule change requests for the National Electricity Rules (the *NER*) and the National Energy Retail Rules (the *NERR*) (in section 1) and the National Gas Rules (the *NGR*) (in section 2) currently under consideration by the Australian Energy Market Commission (the *AEMC*), as well as completed rule changes regarding which the final rule has not yet commenced in full. The status of each proposed rule is regularly updated on the AEMC's website and this document is amended on a monthly basis to reflect those changes.

# National Energy Retail Rules

Since 1 July 2012, the AEMC has held the role of rule maker for the Australian retail energy markets. This includes the power to amend the NERR that are part of the National Energy Customer Framework (the *NECF*). The NECF has commenced in South Australia, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory. Victoria has implemented the NECF in so far as it applies to Chapter 5A of the NERR. Western Australia and the Northern Territory do not propose to implement the NECF. The AEMC may amend the NERR independently to, or in conjunction with, amendments to the NER.

# National Electricity and Gas Rules

Update 2024

#### September 2024 | Rule changes as at 1 October 2024

#### The NER

| New draft<br>determinations | Improving consideration of demand-side factors in<br>the ISP; Better integrating gas and community<br>sentiment into the ISP; Cyber security roles and<br>responsibilities |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Completed rule<br>changes   | Bringing early works forward to improve transmission planning  |
| The <b>NGR</b>              |  |
| New draft<br>determinations | Better integrating gas into the ISP (Gas)  |
| Opportunities               | for stakeholders   |
| Due by                      | Opportunities for submissions  |
| 3 October 2024              | Shortening the settlement cycle  |
| 10 October 2024             | RRO exemption for scheduled bi-directional units   |
| 7 November 2024             | Improving consideration of demand-side factors in the ISP  |
| 7 November 2024             | Better integrating gas and community sentiment into  |
| 7 November 2024             | the ISP  |

### Energy reform

#### AER releases draft gas ring-fencing decision guide

Pursuant to rule 35D of the NGR, the AER has released a draft guide on how it will apply its powers and functions with respect to the gas ring-fencing rules. The gas ring-fencing regime requires pipeline businesses to be separated from other businesses in the gas industry, such as those engaged in producing, blending, purchasing or selling gas (**related business**) to ensure that related businesses do not gain a competitive advantage in accessing regulated pipeline services.

The NGL enforces legal separation of pipeline service providers and related businesses, restricts the sharing of marketing staff, requires separate accounting for pipeline services and regulates 'associate contracts' (that is, contracts between service providers and their associates, or between service providers and other non-arm's length parties providing benefits to their associates, in relation to associate pipeline services). Relevantly, the draft gas ring-fencing guide provides the following:

- (Associate contracts) The NGL prohibits service providers from entering into associate contracts that (1) are intended to or would likely substantially reduce competition in a market for covered gas services or (2) that are inconsistent with the competitive parity rule, unless the associate contract has been approved by the AER having regard to the applicant's stated reasons (s 147, 148). If the AER is reasonably satisfied that neither (1) or (2) applies to an associate contract, it will approve the contract without public consultation. However, even where the AER is not reasonably satisfied, it may still approve the associate contract after undertaking public consultation if it is satisfied that the public benefits of the contract would outweigh the public detriment. The guide sets out factors that the AER will consider in forming these decisions and the timeframes within which those decisions must be made.
  - (Ring-fencing exemptions) In considering whether to grant a ring-fencing exemption, the AER may consider the relative significance of the pipeline in the jurisdiction, the service provider's level of involvement in the pipeline, the cost of compliance as against the public benefit of that compliance and any internal controls established by the applicant. The guide specifies information that an applicant can provide to support its application. The AER must undertake expedited consultation for such applications, and may impose conditions with its decision.
- (Ring-fencing determinations) In deciding whether to impose additional ring-fencing requirements on a service provider, the AER must consider certain principles set out in the guide to prevent preferential treatment of related entities and associates. The AER must undertake expedited consultation prior to imposing these additional ring-fencing requirements.

Consultation closed on 4 October 2024 and the AER will now finalise the draft guide.

READ MORE <u>HERE</u>.

# National Electricity Rules and National Energy Retail Rules Rule change requests

New rule change requests (since last update, 1 September 2024)

There have been no new rule change requests since the last update.

#### Existing rule change requests

| Rule name | Improving the cost recovery arrangements for non-network options                              |
|-----------|---|
| Proponent | Transgrid   |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 22 August 2024 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (19 September 2024) |
| Stage     | Consultation on consultation paper  |

#### Summary of request

This rule change request seeks to address issues with the cost recovery framework for non-network options (*NNOs*) that are restricting the delivery of NNOs as an alternative to network augmentation that may lower costs for consumers. Currently, NNO costs are classed as 'ongoing operating expenditure' that is excluded from the AER's base-step-trend opex approach, with costs recovered by direct pass-through to consumers rather than being incorporated into a TNSP's efficient operating expenditure for a regulatory control period).

The rule change request identifies three key improvements:

- (Initial cost recovery uncertainty) allowing TNSPs to secure cost recovery approval from the AER before, rather than after, the TNSP enters into an agreement
  with an NNO provider (if NNO expenditure is not included in a TNSP's revenue proposal). This aims to reduce cost recovery uncertainty in comparison to other
  network options;
- (Ongoing cost recovery uncertainty) developing a methodology, to be approved by the AER, that clarifies how payments may be adjusted over time to align with the commercial arrangements between a TNSP and a NNO provider, for example in relation to early termination payments. Currently, although the AER is obliged to approve NNO opex if ongoing payment is required as between the TNSP and the NNO provider, there is little guidance as to whether the AER will approve cost recovery in future regulatory periods where there may be variations in NNO costs; and
- (Cost recovery timing) updating a TNSP's network support payment allowance concurrently with the AER's approval of NNO expenditure or, if it is anticipated that NNO costs will change from the amount allowed for in the AER's determination, on application by a TNSP at any time within a regulatory control period. This aims to address lengthy delays between TNSPs incurring and recovering NNO-related costs.

Transgrid submitted that the expedited rule change process should apply to the rule change request, however the AEMC did not consider rule change was urgent because the issues raised do not pose an imminent risk to the effective operation of the NEM or the safety, security or reliability of the national electricity system.

The AEMC expects to publish a draft determination for the rule change on 28 November 2024.

READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | Inter-regional settlement residue arrangements for transmission loops                       |
|-----------|---|
| Proponent | AEMO  |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 8 August 2024 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (5 September 2024) |
| Stage     | Consultation on consultation paper  |

#### Summary of request

This rule change request is the result of AEMO's market integration activities for Project EnergyConnect (*PEC*), a new interconnector linking New South Wales and South Australia which will create the first 'inter-regional transmission loop' in the NEM. Inter-regional settlements residue (*IRSR*) refers to the surplus or deficit in settlement outcomes when electricity flows across jurisdictions with different pricing. IRSR is expected to occur more frequently for PEC as a result of how energy flows in a transmission loop as opposed to **a** standard radial interconnector.

The existing framework for IRSR allocates negative IRSR to the importing region, which AEMO seeks to limit by applying constraints referred to as 'clamping'. AEMO considers that this approach is unsuitable for inter-regional transmission loops where negative IRSR would be disproportionately and unfairly allocated to certain jurisdictions, which doesn't reflect the broader benefits of the loop flow.

In order to help optimise the benefits of PEC for all customers, the rule change request proposes to allocate IRSR depending on the net overall IRSR on the loop such that:

- when the net IRSR is positive, AEMO will not apply clamping constraints; and
- when the net IRSR is negative, AEMO will apply the current approach, meaning that individual connectors would be clamped upon reaching a certain threshold in order to manage negative IRSR (which would flow to the importing TNSP).

The AEMC expects to publish a draft determination for the rule change on 12 December 2024.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name | Improving consideration of demand-side factors in the ISP               |
|-----------|---|
| Proponent | The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy      |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 20 June 2024 Deadline for submissions: 7 November 2024 |
| Stage     | Preparation of final determination                                      |

#### Summary of request

This draft determination seeks to better account for demand-side factors (such as orchestrated CER and distributed resources) in the analysis underpinning the ISP. The draft determination follows one of three rule change requests introduced in June 2024 to enhance the robustness of the ISP's analysis and forecasting to support the energy transition.

The existing rules do not require AEMO to identify and describe the range of actions that are required to facilitate the uptake and availability of CER and distributed resources to a level that meets AEMO's demand-side assumptions in the ISP. Consultation on the proposed rule change demonstrated almost universal support by stakeholders. A key through-line of stakeholder feedback was that the ISP should provide a more holistic and whole-of-system view of the efficient development of the power system and should be able to consider a broad range of information available to it.

The draft rule strengthens and deepens AEMO's analysis of demand-side factors in the ISP by:

- requiring AEMO to publish a demand-side factors statement explaining how it expects the demand side of the market to develop and how demand-side factors affect the efficient development of the power system;
- requiring AEMO to develop information guidelines for gathering data from DNSP's and to publish that information in the ISP database; and
- requiring DNSPs to comply with the information guidelines and publish the information provided in their Distribution Annual Planning Report.

In line with stakeholder feedback, the draft rule differs from the rule change request by expanding the contents of the demand-side factors statement and granting AEMO greater flexibility to determine the data requirements for the information guidelines.

The AEMC published its draft determination on 26 September 2024 and expects to publish a final determination on 19 December 2024. The AEMC is seeking stakeholder feedback on its draft determination until 7 November 2024.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name | Better integrating gas and community sentiment into the ISP             |
|-----------|---|
| Proponent | The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy      |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 20 June 2024 Deadline for submissions: 7 November 2024 |
| Stage     | Preparation of final determination                                      |

#### Summary of request

This draft determination consolidates two rule change requests introduced in June 2024 by the Minister for Energy and Climate Change:

- better integrating gas into the ISP; and
- better integrating community sentiment into the ISP.

These rule change requests sought to enhance the robustness of the ISP's analysis and forecasting to support the energy transition.

While AEMO does incorporate data relating to gas-powered generation in its ISP analysis, the NER does not expressly require AEMO to have regard to the required capital expenditure or overall feasibility of gas-powered generation projects (including any gas supply constraints that might affect these projects) in undertaking that analysis. Equally, the NER does not expressly require AEMO to consider the sentiment of local communities towards transmission projects as part of the ISP, and TNSPs are not obliged to share any information about community sentiment that they may have collected.

The AEMC notes that there was broad support from stakeholders regarding the proposed gas rule change, which underscored the importance of modelling accurate gas assumptions into the ISP. Gas market participants expressed a desire to utilise existing information collected under the NGR to minimise additional reporting, but also emphasised the importance of maintaining confidentiality. Although there was considerable support for community sentiment to be considered in the ISP, stakeholders expressed mixed views on whether a rule change was required to achieve this.

As such, the draft determination seeks to introduce new requirements on AEMO to include gas development projections in the ISP and to explain (1) the inputs, assumptions and scenarios underpinning those projections and (2) how those projections differ from existing gas publications (where applicable). These projections may relate to price, availability, demand and the capacity and utilisation of gas facilities. The draft determination proposes to amend the NGR to allow AEMO to use information collected under the NGR for its national transmission planner function.

The draft determination does not propose changes in relation to integrating community sentiment into the ISP because the AEMC considers that the NER is already sufficiently flexible to enable this (for example, under clause 5.22.10(a)(5) of the NER).

The AEMC published its draft determination on 26 September 2024 and expects to publish a final determination on 19 December 2024. The AEMC is seeking stakeholder feedback on its draft determination until 7 November 2024.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name | Cyber security roles and responsibilities  |
|-----------|--|
| Proponent | The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy                     |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 20 June 2024 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (18 July 2024) |
| Stage     | Preparation of draft determination   |

#### Summary of request

This draft determination aims to clarify and enhance the cyber security roles and responsibilities of AEMO to improve cyber security preparedness. The AEMC agreed with the two shortcomings of the existing rules identified by the proponents of the rule change request: the NER does not explicitly consider cyber security as it relates to power system security and it does not clearly define AEMO's role in bolstering cyber security.

Stakeholders expressed support for increased clarity on AEMO's roles and responsibilities pertaining to cyber security, but expressed concern regarding the cost of the proposed changes, duplication of roles between AEMO and other agencies and the lack of detail in the proposal. The AEMC considered these issues but formed the view that the increased costs are justified by the importance of managing cyber risks, AEMO's role is not duplicative and the draft determination provides enough additional clarity about AEMO's roles.

The draft determination proposes that cyber security be explicitly included in the NER as an aspect of AEMO's mandate to improve power system security. It also proposes four new functions for AEMO that focus on preventing cyber incidents and preparing the industry to respond if an incident does occur, including:

(Cyber security incident coordinator) planning and coordinating a NEM-wide response to any cyber incidents impacting the energy sector. This includes
developing and implementing the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Incident Response Plan (AESCIRP), and undertaking testing and scenario training to increase
preparedness;

- (Supporting cyber preparedness) updating and maintaining the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework (AESCSF), organising testing and training exercises, and providing industry guidance and advice;
- (Examining cyber risks) as system operator, providing cyber security research and advice to governments upon request, alongside other cyber security bodies; and
- (Distributing information) circulating critical cyber security information among market participants, including warnings of vulnerabilities, AESCSF assessment conclusions, post-incident reports and preventative patches.

To allow AEMO to perform these additional functions and recover its costs, the draft determination seeks to increase the total amount of participant fees by 2 per cent each year. AEMO would be immune from liability for the delivery of these services.

The AEMC published its draft determination on 26 September 2024 and expects to publish a final determination on 12 December 2024. The AEMC are seeking feedback on the draft determination by 7 November 2024.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | RRO exemption for scheduled bi-directional units                       |
|-----------|--|
| Proponent | Tesla; Neoen; Iberdrola  |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 30 May 2024 Deadline for submissions: 10 October 2024 |
| Stage     | Consultation on draft determination                                    |

#### Summary of request

This draft determination proposes that large-scale batteries and pumped hydro energy storage be exempted from being liable entities under the RRO. At the moment, storage assets with an annual electricity consumption of more than 10GWh/year are liable entities under the RRO. The RRO requires liable entities to enter into 'qualifying contracts' to cover their share of the peak demand forecast for their region during the relevant reliability gap period.

The proponents argue that the current rule creates a perverse incentive to avoid consuming energy to provide FCAS and other system security services during a gap period, because consuming energy may attract penalties and Procurer of Last Resort costs under the RRO. As a result, storage assets may withhold the provision of system security services to avoid being liable under the RRO, which may increase system security risks. In preparing the draft rule, the AEMC incorporated stakeholder feedback to expand the application of the rule to pumped hydro energy storage assets (rather than only applying to battery storage systems).

The AEMC considers that the draft determination will:

• (Improve security) allow energy storage assets to prioritise security services without the risk of triggering RRO penalties. The exemption for pumped hydro energy storage unlocks additional capacity for grid-supporting services during periods with reliability gaps;

- (Increase FCAS market health) reduce the risk of inflating FCAS prices during reliability gap periods, which in turn prevents the increase in other market costs
  including RRO penalty risks, the cost to hedge against those risks, or the costs of AEMO issuing compensable directions where there is a risk to power system
  security; and
- (Provide a simple and cheap solution to the security problem) implement a simple solution to this issue which can be implemented in advance of the next potential contract position day, being 1 December 2024, without the impractical implementation process for alternative solutions which require nuanced exemption of FCAS load from the RRO.

The AEMC published its draft determination on 22 August 2024. Stakeholders are encouraged to make submissions by 10 October 2024.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name | Providing flexibility in the allocation of interconnector costs                                  |
|-----------|--|
| Proponent | The Honourable Chris Bowen MP; The Honourable Lily D'Ambrosio MP; The Honourable Nick Duigan MLC |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 14 March 2024 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (1 August 2024)         |
| Stage     | Preparation of final determination   |

#### Summary of request

The AEMC has published a more preferable draft rule that addresses barriers in the existing regulatory framework that may prevent the development of interconnectors with net market benefits. The draft rule currently applies to both private and government interconnectors that, as at 12 September 2024, are yet to be constructed, are being materially upgraded or have been converted from a market network service to a regulated asset.

The draft rule seeks to improve flexibility in the allocation of costs for interconnector projects between NEM jurisdictions by allowing jurisdictions (through their relevant Minister) to enter into inter-governmental agreements specifying an agreed cost allocation.

The agreements, which must be submitted to the AER for review by a specified deadline and must meet defined implementation criteria, will specify the allocation of project costs to each jurisdiction over an agreed timeframe (as well as how this allocation may change over the life of the asset). The agreements would override existing rules that would otherwise determine the cost allocation; otherwise, the existing rules will continue to apply where there is no intergovernmental agreement in place.

The draft rule would not impact a TNSP's total regulated revenue but would allow for a specified amount of that total revenue to be collected through a TNSP in the counterparty government's NEM region. Once a TNSP receives an inter-governmental agreement, it will be required to amend its pricing methodology to give effect to the agreement through adjustments to the annual aggregate revenue requirement (AARR) component. The proposed methodology must be submitted to the AER for approval. Jurisdictions will be able to submit agreements to TNSPs prior to a regulatory control period for incorporation in their revenue determination process for that regulatory control period, or during an existing regulatory control period. The draft rule does not propose to change how settlement residue auction proceeds are distributed.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | Accelerating smart meter deployment  |  |
|-----------|--|--|
| Proponent | SA Power Networks; Intellihub; Alinta  |  |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 14 March 2024 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (30 May 2024) |  |
| Stage     | Preparation of final determination   |  |

#### Summary of request

This rule change request seeks to expedite the deployment of smart meters to all customers in the NEM by 2030 and improve the metering framework. Under the fast-track rule change process, the AEMC published a draft determination and draft rule on 4 April 2024.

The draft rule would introduce two core reforms, implementing recommendations from the AEMC's Review of the Regulatory Framework for Metering Services:

- (Accelerated deployment of smart meters) The AEMC considers the deployment of smart meters is a cost-effective decarbonisation strategy, which also reduces the costs of meter reads and metering installations borne by consumers. To achieve the AEMC's objective of universal uptake of smart meters by 2030, the AEMC will implement transitional rules during an 'acceleration phase' from 2025 to 2030, which implements the Legacy Meter Replacement Plan framework.
- (Access to power quality data) This second component involves an expansion of consumer data access and control requirements in the NER and NERR with the aim of saving energy, improving network safety and increasing hosting capacity.

The draft rule also proposes four supporting reforms. The AEMC expects to publish a directions paper in August 2024 seeking stakeholder feedback and a final determination on 28 November 2024.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | Shortening the settlement cycle  |
|-----------|--|
| Proponent | GloBird Energy Pty Ltd   |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 22 February 2024 Deadline for submissions: 3 October 2024 |
| Stage     | Consultation on draft determination  |

#### Summary of request

This draft determination proposes to shorten the settlement cycle (the period during which AEMO and market participants settle transactions for the relevant billing period) from 20 business days after the end of a billing period, to 11 business days. This differs from the proponent's original rule change request which sought to shorten the settlement cycle to 10 business days. The additional day proposed under the draft determination follows input from AEMO which considered that there would be significant administrative pressures for AEMO if it were required to issue draft and final statements on the same day.

The AEMC considers that shortening the settlement cycle will:

- lower credit support requirements for market participants, and therefore the costs imposed on market participants pursuant to the prudential regime;
- reduce the impact of call notices from AEMO, by potentially decreasing the working capital held by market participants to respond to call notices; and
- have flow-on benefits for:
  - retailers (particularly smaller retailers that typically have less access to capital and higher financing costs), by freeing up working capital, supporting
    investment in service offering improvements, minimising barriers to enter the market and lowering the risk of retailer failure; and
  - consumers, through access to better service offerings, increased competition and a lower risk of customer disruption as a result of retailer failures.

The AEMC published its draft determination on 8 August 2024. Stakeholders are encouraged to make submissions by 3 October 2024.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | Integrating price-responsive resources into the NEM                        |
|-----------|--|
| Proponent | AEMO   |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 3 August 2023 Deadline for submissions: 12 September 2024 |
| Stage     | Consultation on draft determination  |

#### Summary of request

This rule change request is part of a series of reforms being progressed to better integrate CER into the NEM and enable the benefits of CER to be realised for consumers. On 25 July 2024, the AEMC published a draft determination and more preferable draft rule, which:

- establishes a framework for voluntary scheduled resources (VSR) to participate in central dispatch processes (known as 'dispatch mode'), which may be on an individual or aggregate basis;
- creates a time-limited incentive mechanism to encourage VSR participation wherein AEMO will run tenders to pay eligible participants to enter into dispatch processes for the first five years after the scheme is established; and
- imposes new monitoring and reporting obligations to allow AEMO and the AER to evaluate the flow-on consequences of price-responsive CER for AEMO's short-term demand forecasts.

Currently, these types of resources are not fully integrated into the NEM's planning and operation functions, and are therefore not adequately accounted for when determining the level of energy demand, how the demand should be met and the price for energy. These features allow energy service providers that use CER (eg batteries, rooftop solar, electric vehicles and home energy management systems) and other price-responsive resources to participate in NEM scheduling and dispatch processes.

The AEMC's view is that more efficient integration of CER would result in \$834 million in cost savings. The draft determination more specifically:

- improves AEMO's demand forecasting and, as a result, decreases the level of resources that it needs to dispatch to meet demand, and improves network planning and investment activities, reducing network costs for consumers;
- reduces spot prices through better alignment of supply and demand;
- reduces the need for expensive generation reserves to correct the market, achieving system security at a lower cost; and
- lowers the cost of AEMO interventions.

The AEMC will host a virtual public forum on 27 August 2024 to provide an overview of the draft determination and draft rule, and expects to publish a final determination on 19 December 2024.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name | Efficient provision of inertia  |
|-----------|---|
| Proponent | Australian Energy Council   |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 2 March 2023 Deadline for submissions: Deadline passed (31 March 2023) |
| Stage     | Preparation of directions paper   |

#### Summary of request

The AEC's rule change request proposes to introduce an inertia spot market in the NEM. This reform is intended to support the energy transition and address the challenge of declining system inertia, caused in part by the retirement of synchronous coal- and gas-fired generators and the prevalence of inverter-based resources in the NEM. The AEC's view is that the existing framework for managing and procuring system inertia is inefficient and no longer fit for purpose.

The AEC's proposed design, which largely aligns with the design of existing FCAS markets, has the following features:

- a centrally priced and cleared spot market for inertia, with inertia offered through competitive bids;
- the volume of demand for inertia would be determined by AEMO on a dynamic basis, based on the variable needs of the power system;
- the market would clear at the bid price of the marginal participant, and all dispatched inertia providers would receive the same price; and
- AEMO would prepare forecasts for price and inertia demand, to assist inertia spot market participants to make decisions about their bidding behaviour.

In the consultation paper, the AEMC proposes alternative options to the AEC's proposed design, which are as follows:

- (market-based mechanism) introduce an ahead or close to real-time market, through which AEMO would seek competitive bids to provide inertia in the leadup to dispatch;
- (market-based mechanism) pay inertia providers to relieve inertia constraints, based on a 'marginal value of inertia';
- (market-based mechanism) implement a rate of change of frequency (*RoCoF*) control service market, which would operate in a similar way to Western Australia's wholesale electricity market RoCoF control service;

- (structured procurement option) adjust the operation of the current TNSP procurement framework to address identified issues;
- (structured procurement option) require AEMO to procure inertia through short- or long-term bilateral forward contracts; and
- maintain the existing framework until further technical work is undertaken, to better understand the long-term requirements of the power system regarding inertia.

The AEMC has announced that it is currently considering improvements to the existing inertia framework through *the Improving security frameworks for the energy transition* rule change. The AEMC will therefore focus on completing the *Improving security frameworks for the energy transition* rule change before considering more complex options under this rule change.

The AEMC expects to publish a directions paper by November 2024 and a draft determination by 27 June 2025.

READ MORE HERE.

# Completed rule changes

Final rule determinations (since last update, 1 September 2024)

| Rule name                   | Bringing early works forward to improve transmission planning |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amending rule               | NER 2024 No. 17   |
| Date of final determination | 5 September 2024  |
| Commencement Date           | 5 September 2024  |

#### Summary of request

This rule change incentivises TNSPs to undertake early works on actionable ISP projects earlier in the development process by improving the cost recovery arrangements for those early works and therefore improving investment certainty and transmission planning efficiency. It implements recommendations made in the AEMC's Transmission Planning and Investment Review Stage 3 final report. The rule:

- (Brings forward early works CPA submissions) allows TNSPs to submit an early works contingent project application (CPA) for an actionable ISP project without first completing a RIT-T and passing AEMO's feedback loop assessment (both of which are currently pre-conditions to submitting a CPA), provided the value of the CPA meets the relevant threshold. The final rule has lowered the relevant threshold, setting it at the lower of \$30 million or 5% of the TNSP's maximum allowed revenue for the first year of the relevant regulatory control period (previously, the threshold was the higher of these two amounts).
- (Provides guidance as to the scope of early works) introduces a definition of 'early works' and introduces principles that the AER must consider when assessing an early works CPA. 'Early works' will include activities undertaken in respect of an actionable ISP project prior to construction of the preferred option, which improve the accuracy of cost estimates for the project and facilitate the project being delivered within the timeframes in the most recent ISP. 'Early works' captures more significant, capex activities (eg detailed and comprehensive stakeholder engagement, detailed engineering design, land-use planning, equipment procurement), which can be distinguished from *preparatory activities* (cl 5.10.2) recoverable by TNSPs as general operating expenditure. In assessing whether to approve costs under an early works CPA for an actionable ISP project, the AER must have regard to whether the early works relate to at least one RIT-T option or could be sold or utilised to support other projects.
- (Empowers AEMO to specify early works / preparatory activities) empowers AEMO to specify early works for an actionable ISP project and preparatory activities for a future ISP project, which a TNSP must carry out.
- (Delays ISP review) delays the AEMC's ISP review from 1 July 2025 to 1 July 2027 to accommodate ongoing changes to the ISP framework.

After considering stakeholder feedback on the draft determination, the AEMC also introduced the following changes to the final rule:

• (Treatment of early works expenditure) the final rule provides that costs incurred by a TNSP for early works that cannot be sold or used on another project should be treated as 'sunk' and excluded from the RIT-T, as well as being ignored for the purposes of AEMO's feedback loop assessment. However, where those early works costs can be sold or utilised for other projects, these may be included in the RIT-T. In order to facilitate this treatment, the RIT-T and any subsequent CPA should transparently document all early works costs which are considered 'sunk' for the purpose of the assessment.

• (Transitional rules) the final rule implements a suite of transitional rules that provide the AER with 12 months to publish an updated cost benefit analysis guideline and allow TNSPs to elect whether to apply the final rule to RIT-Ts that are already underway.

READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

#### Other rules not yet commenced

| Rule name                      | Unlocking CER benefits through flexible trading (Electricity and Retail)                |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Amending rule                  | NER 2024 No. 15; NERR 2024 No. 4  |
| Date of final<br>determination | 15 August 2024  |
| Commencement Date              | 29 August 2024 (NER Schedules 1 and 6; NERR Schedule 3)<br>31 May 2025 (NER Schedule 2) |
|                                | 1 November 2026 (NER Schedules 3, 4 and 5; NERR Schedules 1 and 2)                      |

#### Summary of request

These rule changes introduce new arrangements to promote a flexible trading market for CER, such as rooftop solar, batteries and electric vehicle chargers. Consumers can optimise the value of their CER by contracting on different terms (including price) with multiple financially responsible market participants for different components of their load, rather than having their CER connected at one connection point with one associated meter (as per the existing model). The rule change request was developed as part of the Energy Security Board's CER implementation plan.

The rules have three key elements:

- enabling large customers to select multiple energy service providers for their premises, without using the embedded network framework or establishing multiple connection points to the distribution network in order to obtain a second National Metering Identifier;
- allowing consumers, and retailers and aggregators acting as agents for consumers, to identify and manage their flexible CER separately from other 'passive' or inflexible consumer loads (such as lights and fridges), including by enabling the establishment of secondary settlement points without requiring a second physical connection to the distribution network; and
- creating two new meter types with lower minimum specifications to enable in-built measurement capability in technology (such as EV chargers) to be used for settlement and billing, instead of requiring additional meters.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name                      | Managing ISP project uncertainty through targeted ex post reviews |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Amending rule                  | NER 2024 No. 14   |
| Date of final<br>determination | 1 August 2024   |
| Commencement date              | 5 September 2024 (Schedule 3)                                     |

#### 4 September 2025 (Schedules 1 and 2)

#### Summary of request

Implementing findings from the Transmission Planning and Investment Review Stage 3 final report, this rule will permit the AER to undertake discrete ex post reviews of a TNSP's capital expenditure for specific ISP and non-ISP projects. Under the current framework, such a review only assesses a TNSP's total capital expenditure across all of its projects (rather than on a project-by-project basis).

The final rule aims to promote efficient project delivery by empowering the AER to assess the overall efficiency of capex incurred by TNSPs for specific large energy transmission projects and resolving uncertainty around the treatment of non-ISP capex under the ex post review mechanism. Under the final rule, an ex post review will be triggered:

- for a substantially completed ISP project / project stage (a 'reviewable ISP project'), when incurred capex exceeds the project's forecast capex (ie the 'ISP overspending requirement' has been met); and
- for a non-ISP project, when incurred capex exceeds the forecast capex for all non-ISP projects during the applicable review period (ie the 'overspending requirement' has been met).

Where a TNSP overspends the project's forecast capex allowance, the AER may exclude this amount from a TNSP's regulated asset base to the extent the AER determines the overspend does not meet the prudency and efficiency criteria for capital expenditure in the NER.

This rule gives the AER more flexibility to assess capex efficiency across the 'ISP project review period', being all years in which capex is incurred for a particular ISP project, including where capex is incurred over multiple regulatory control periods. The rule does not change the timing of when an ex post review occurs or the AER's process for conducting an ex post review.

The AEMC has also included transitional provisions that allow the AER to adjust a TNSP's future revenue allowance to offset the impact of penalties received under the existing capital expenditure sharing scheme (*CESS*), so as to prevent TNSPs from being penalised twice where an overspend is assessed as inefficient. The CESS will continue to operate in conjunction with the new targeted ex post review regime.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE</u>.

| Rule name                   | Improving security frameworks for the energy transition |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amending rule               | NER 2024 No. 9  |
| Date of final determination | 28 March 2024   |
| Commencement date           | 4 April 2024 (Schedule 9)                               |
|                             | 3 June 2024 (Schedule 1)                                |
|                             | 4 July 2024 (Schedule 2)                                |
|                             | 1 December 2024 (Schedules 3, 4, 6 and 7)               |
|                             | 2 December 2025 (Schedules 5 and 8)                     |

#### Details

In order to ensure the sufficient provision of system security services throughout the energy transition, this final rule seeks to enhance the existing procurement arrangements for these services and arm AEMO with additional tools to effectively manage system security issues. In turn, this will also reduce AEMO's reliance on market interventions to achieve system security outcomes and send better signals to participants to provide these types of services over the long term.

Specifically, the final rule:

- aligns the procurement timeframes under the current inertia and system strength frameworks;
- amends the network support and control ancillary services framework to remove the exclusion to procuring inertia network services and system strength;
- updates the procedures for TNSPs to recover their costs of non-network security options, including by introducing an annual process for forecasting and recovery of these costs;
- establishes a new transitional framework under which AEMO can procure necessary non-market ancillary services, and also trial new sources of security services;
- allows AEMO to enable (or schedule) security services on a NEM-wide basis;
- enhances transparency in relation to directions to market participants, by amending market notice requirements and the timing for AEMO to provide postevent directions reports, and requiring the publication of a breakdown of compensation paid to directed and affected participants; and
- requires AEMO to publish a new annual report (the 'transition plan for system security'), setting out the actions it will take to manage system security through the transition to a zero-emissions power system.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name                   | Enhancing reserve information (formerly Operating reserves) |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amending rule               | NER 2024 No. 6  |
| Date of final determination | 21 March 2024   |
| Commencement date           | 1 July 2025 (Schedule 1)                                    |
|                             | 1 July 2027 (Schedule 2)                                    |

#### Details

While the original rule change requests from Iberdrola and Delta Electricity sought to leverage the existing FCAS framework and introduce an operating reserve market or services specific to the provision of reserves to respond to unexpected changes in supply and demand, the AEMC's final determination resolved to not implement an operating reserve market. The key reason for this is that the AEMC considers an operating reserve market would not offer any significant improvements compared to the current arrangements, and would materially increase market costs.

Instead, the final rule improves the existing arrangements and increases transparency around energy availability in the NEM, to facilitate efficient responses from market participants to unexpected fluctuations in supply and demand, when reserves are required. Specifically, the final rule requires AEMO to publish energy availability information in the operational timeframe, including:

- (state of charge) the energy availability of batteries, aggregated by region, in close to real time and also on the following trading day by dispatchable unit identifier; and
- (daily energy constraints) the combined energy constraints of other scheduled plant types (hydro, gas and coal), aggregated by region and published on a daily basis.

The final rule also requires storage participants to provide their maximum storage capacity to AEMO in their bid and offer validation data.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name                   | Clarifying mandatory primary frequency response obligations for bidirectional plant |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amending rule               | NER 2024 No. 3  |
| Date of final determination | 7 March 2024  |
| Commencement date           | 3 June 2024 (Schedule 1)<br>8 June 2025 (Schedule 2)                                |

#### Details

This final rule seeks to address the concern that existing mandatory PFR and PFR incentive arrangements may not be sufficient to encourage the provision of frequency control services to the power system in a consistent and predictable way over the long term. Specifically, this final rule requires scheduled bidirectional units (ie, batteries with a capacity of 5MW or greater) to provide mandatory PFR when they receive a dispatch instruction to:

- generate electricity (from 3 June 2024 onwards);
- charge (except when solely powering auxiliary loads) (from 8 June 2025 onwards); and
- provide a regulation service (from 8 June 2025 onwards).

The rule does not require batteries to provide PFR when idle or when enabled solely for contingency FCAS, although battery owners may elect to provide PFR in these circumstances in order to receive frequency performance payments. It is also important to note that the new rule will not apply to pumped hydro projects, given that they will not be classified as bidirectional units under the 'Integrating energy storage systems into the NEM' rule.

In addition to the key changes outlined above, the final rule also implements a number of minor changes, including to clarify that:

- battery operators will not be required to renegotiate their connection arrangements when revising PFR settings to comply with this final rule; and
- semi-scheduled generators and scheduled bidirectional units must obtain AEMO's consent before making any changes to frequency control settings.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name                   | Amendment of the Market Price Cap, Cumulative Price Threshold and Administered Price Cap |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Amending rule               | NER 2023 No. 6   |
| Date of final determination | 7 December 2023  |
| Commencement date           | 1 July 2025 (Schedule 1)<br>1 July 2026 (Schedule 2)<br>1 July 2027 (Schedule 3)         |

#### Details

This final rule amends the market price cap (*MPC*), cumulative price threshold (*CPT*) and administered price cap (*APC*) from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2028, as follows:

| Market price setting | 1 July 2025     | 1 July 2026     | 1 July 2027     |
|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| MPC                  | \$18,600/MWh    | \$20,700/MWh    | \$22,800/MWh    |
| СРТ                  | \$1,674,000/MWh | \$1,987,200/MWh | \$2,325,600/MWh |
| CPT hours at MPC     | 7.5             | 8               | 8.5             |
| APC                  | \$600/MWh       | \$600/MWh       | \$600/MWh       |

The AEMC considered that existing market price settings were too low to support sufficient investment in generation, demand response and storage, to address shortages in supply and periods of high prices, and maintain the reliability of the system.

#### READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

| Rule name                   | Amending the administered price cap |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Amending rule               | NER 2022 No. 11                     |
| Date of final determination | 17 November 2022                    |
| Commencement date           | 17 November 2022 (Schedule 3)       |
|                             | 1 December 2022 (Schedule 1)        |
|                             | 1 July 2025 (Schedule 2)            |

#### Details

This final rule increases the **APC** under the NER from \$300/MWh to \$600/MWh, with effect until 30 June 2025. The APC is the maximum spot price paid to generators in the NEM during an administered price period (*APP*). The APC is designed to limit market participants' financial exposure to spot prices during extended periods of significant price volatility, while also providing adequate spot market revenue to generators to cover their short-term costs and encourage continued dispatch into the market. An APP is triggered when the sum of spot prices in the preceding seven-day period exceeds the **CPT**, currently \$1,398,100.

The AEMC did not make any transitional changes to the CPT as part of this final rule.

As part of its 2022 Reliability Standard and Settings Review, the Reliability Panel recommended that, for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2028, the APC be increased to \$500/MWh and the CPT be increased in three progressive annual adjustments to reach \$2,193,000 by the end of that period. This final rule will apply on a transitional basis, with any change to the longer-term settings of the APC and CPT to be considered once a rule change request is made to implement the Reliability Panel's recommendations.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name                   | Primary frequency response incentive arrangements |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Amending rule               | NER 2022 No. 8                                    |
| Date of final determination | 8 September 2022                                  |
| Commencement date           | 8 September 2022 (Clause 7, Schedules 1, 3 and 4) |
|                             | 8 June 2025 (Schedule 2)                          |

#### Details

This final rule amends the NER to value the provision of **PFR** by participants in the NEM under the mandatory PFR requirement, and also to encourage the voluntary provision of additional PFR.

Key features of the final rule include:

- frequency performance payments: a new two-sided frequency performance payments process, whereby market participants who achieve positive contribution factors (ie, behaviour that assists in controlling system frequency) will receive performance payments, and the costs of those performance payments will be borne by market participants with negative contribution factors (ie, behaviour that contributes to deviations in system frequency). This new payments process expands on the existing 'causer pays' arrangements for the allocation of FCAS costs and will commence on 8 June 2025. AEMO will also be required to develop a new frequency contribution factors procedure setting out the process for calculating contribution factors, and must publish the first procedure by 8 June 2023;
- continuation of mandatory PFR: confirmation that the requirement for scheduled and semi-scheduled generators to automatically respond to fluctuations in
  power system frequency (ie, the mandatory PFR requirement) will continue beyond 4 June 2023, on the basis that these arrangements send a clear signal to

market entrants that they are required to provide PFR and, since their implementation, have been an effective mechanism to improve frequency performance; and

• **reporting:** requirements for AEMO (from 8 September 2022) and the AER (from 8 June 2025) to report on levels of aggregate frequency responsiveness and the costs of frequency performance payments respectively. This change is designed to provide relevant information to market participants and to enable stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of the arrangements for frequency control moving forward.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name                   | Enhancing information on generator availability in MT PASA |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Amending rule               | NER 2022 No. 7   |
| Date of final determination | 18 August 2022   |
| Commencement date           | 18 August 2022 (Schedule 4)                                |
|                             | 9 October 2023 (Schedule 1)                                |
|                             | 3 June 2024 (Schedule 2)                                   |
|                             | 31 July 2025 (Schedule 3)                                  |

#### Details

This final rule enhances the adequacy and transparency of information regarding unit availability in the medium-term projected assessment of system adequacy (*MT PASA*), which scheduled generators are required to provide to AEMO.

In addition to the current requirement for generators to indicate their daily MW availability over the medium term (between seven days and 36 months), the final rule requires scheduled generators to provide a generating unit's:

- unit state in the form of standardised reason codes that explain the availability status of the unit; and
- unit recall time (for certain reason codes only), being the expected time to return the unit to full availability under normal conditions after a period of unavailability.

This additional information will be collected for the same 36-month period for MT PASA, and published as part of the existing MT PASA process. AEMO will develop standardised reason codes that differentiate between economic reasons for unavailability, such as low wholesale prices making continued operation uncommercial, and physical reasons, such as planned maintenance.

Requirements for the collection and publication of reason codes and recall times are defined in AEMO's reliability standard implementation guideline and MT PASA process description.

The substantive provisions of the final rule come into effect on 9 October 2023, and the requirements will also apply to scheduled bidirectional units on commencement of the *Integrating energy storage systems into the NEM* rule in June 2024.

#### READ MORE HERE.

| Rule name                   | Updating Short Term PASA  |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Amending rule               | NER 2022 No. 4            |
| Date of final determination | 5 May 2022                |
| Commencement date           | 19 May 2022 (Schedule 3)  |
|                             | 3 June 2024 (Schedule 2)  |
|                             | 31 July 2025 (Schedule 1) |

#### Details

This final rule amends the requirements for AEMO and market participants in relation to short-term projected assessment of system adequacy (ST PASA).

In particular, the final rule:

- introduces a principles-based framework, directly linked to the PASA objective in clause 3.7.1(b) of the NER, to provide greater flexibility to AEMO and market participants to update ST PASA as the market continues to develop;
- requires AEMO to develop and publish ST PASA procedures, which must be developed and amended in accordance with the NER consultation procedures;
- amends the timeframe that ST PASA covers to each 30-minute period (or such shorter period as determined by AEMO) in at least the seven trading days from and including the day of publication; and
- requires AEMO to publish generation availability information on a dispatchable unit identifier basis, to improve the transparency of information available to market participants.

AEMO is required to publish the ST PASA procedures by 30 April 2025, to give stakeholders three months to comply with these procedures before the changes are implemented on 31 July 2025.

READ MORE HERE.

# National Gas Rules Rule change requests

#### New rule change requests (since last update, 1 September 2024)

There have been no new rule change requests since the last update.

#### Existing rule change requests

| Rule name | Better integrating gas and community sentiment into the ISP (Gas)       |  |
|-----------|---|--|
| Proponent | The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy      |  |
| Key dates | Initiation date: 20 June 2024 Deadline for submissions: 7 November 2024 |  |
| Stage     | Preparation of final determination                                      |  |

Summary of request

Please refer to the summary of this draft determination (above) in relation to the NER.

READ MORE <u>HERE</u>.

# Completed rule changes

Final rule determinations (since last update, 1 September 2024)

There have been no new completed rule changes since the last update.

#### Other rules not yet commenced

| Rule name                   | DWGM interim LNG storage measures                                |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Amending rule               | NGR 2022 No. 4   |
| Date of final determination | 15 December 2022   |
| Commencement date           | 15 December 2022 (Schedules 1 and 2)<br>2 July 2026 (Schedule 3) |

#### Details

This final rule gives AEMO broader powers to address threats to system security and reliability of supply in the **DWGM** between 2023 and 2025, in light of the recent decline in the amount of liquefied natural gas (*LNG*) held in storage and the contracted capacity at the Dandenong LNG storage facility.

Under the final rule, AEMO will act as:

1. Buyer of last resort:

- AEMO must contract any storage capacity at the Dandenong LNG storage facility that is uncontracted by 1 March each year. AEMO may also procure any additional uncontracted storage capacity for winter that becomes available after 1 March each year.
- AEMO must aim to achieve the highest level of contracted capacity reasonably possible by the beginning of winter, or a lower amount as determined by AEMO and approved by the Victorian Minister.
- AEMO must relinquish contracted capacity if APA (as the LNG storage provider) requests it to do so in order to meet a request from a market participant, and may transfer LNG stock to a market participant if that participant has acquired relinquished capacity.
- 2. Supplier of last resort:
  - AEMO may inject gas from its LNG reserve into the DWGM where it reasonably considers that a threat to system security is unlikely to subside without its intervention.
  - AEMO may also dispose of LNG stock where it is obliged to do so under a contractual or regulatory obligation (using a bid price of \$0/GJ).
  - AEMO's LNG reserve gas may only be included in a pricing schedule and an operating schedule after all available market participants' bids have been scheduled, and AEMO's injection bids from LNG reserve must be at a price equal to the value of lost load (ie, \$800/GJ).

The final rule also sets out processes for AEMO to recover its costs as buyer and supplier of last resort, and establishes a new cost-recovery proceeds distribution process. It also outlines the contractual arrangements between AEMO and APA (the owner and operator of the Dandenong LNG Facility) to facilitate AEMO's two roles.

The rule applies as an interim measure between 2023 and 2025 while the Energy Ministers develop broader reforms to system security and reliability in the DWGM.

READ MORE <u>HERE.</u>

# Glossary

In this document, the following definitions apply:

| AEMC  | Australian Energy Market Commission         |
|-------|---|
| AEMO  | Australian Energy Market Operator           |
| AER   | Australian Energy Regulator                 |
| APC   | administered price cap                      |
| APP   | administered price period                   |
| CER   | consumer energy resources                   |
| СРТ   | cumulative price threshold                  |
| DER   | distributed energy resources                |
| DNSP  | distribution network service provider       |
| DWGM  | declared wholesale gas market               |
| ESB   | Energy Security Board                       |
| FCAS  | frequency control ancillary services        |
| FRMP  | financially responsible market participant  |
| IRP   | Integrated Resource Provider                |
| ISP   | Integrated System Plan                      |
| LNG   | liquefied natural gas                       |
| MPC   | market price cap                            |
| NECF  | National Energy Customer Framework          |
| NER   | National Electricity Rules                  |
| NERL  | National Energy Retail Law                  |
| NERR  | National Energy Retail Rules                |
| NEM   | National Electricity Market                 |
| NGR   | National Gas Rules                          |
| NSP   | network service provider                    |
| PFR   | primary frequency response                  |
| RIT-T | Regulatory Investment Test for Transmission |
| RRO   | Retailer Reliability Obligation             |
| TNSP  | transmission network service provider       |
| TUOS  | transmission use of system                  |
|       |   |

## Contacts



Kate Axup Partner, Melbourne T +61 3 9613 8449 Kate.Axup@allens.com.au



Andrew Mansour Partner, Sydney T +61 2 9230 4552 Andrew.Mansour@allens.com.au



Melissa Keane Partner, Melbourne T +61 3 9613 8806 Melissa.Keane@allens.com.au



Karla Drinkwater Partner, Brisbane T +61 7 3334 3337 Karla.Drinkwater@allens.com.au



Jodi Reinmuth Partner, Perth

T +61 8 9488 3702 Jodi.Reinmuth@allens.com.au



Louis Chiam Partner, Melbourne

T +61 3 9613 8867 Louis.Chiam@allens.com.au



Danielle Jones Partner, Sydney T +61 2 9230 4309 Danielle.Jones@allens.com.au



Skye Kirby Managing Associate, Melbourne T +61 3 9613 8883 Skye.Kirby@allens.com.au

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